Debt Relief and Growth: A study of Zambia and Tanzania by Bigsten, Arne et al.
Copyright  Author(s) 2001
1Department of Economics, Göteborg University (Sweden); 2 Department of Economics, Örebro
University (Sweden); 3 Department of Economics, Örebro University (Sweden)
This is a revised version of the paper originally prepared for the UNU/WIDER development conference
on Debt Relief, Helsinki, 17-18 August 2001.
UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution from the governments of Denmark,
Finland and Norway to the 2000-2001 Research Programme.
Discussion Paper No. 2001/104
Debt Relief and Growth
A Study of Zambia and Tanzania
Arne Bigsten,1 Jörgen Levin,2
and Håkan Persson 3
October 2001
Abstract
This paper discusses some issues on how to evaluate the impact of HIPC debt relief in
the cases of Tanzania and Zambia using two computable general equilibrium models.
Within our relatively simple model framework, we found that the macroeconomic
impact of debt relief is modest. One reason for this relatively modest impact is that the
annual injection of additional resources relative to current actual debt service is small in
both cases, which implies that the impact of debt relief per se would be expected to be
modest. However, as illustrated in the case of Tanzania the impact could be
considerably higher if additional public investment succeeds to improve private sector
productivity.
Keywords: HIPC, Zambia, Tanzania, CGE-models, growth
JEL classification: F34, O11, O19UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-030-3 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-031-1 (internet publication)1
1 Introduction
The issue of debt relief has been hotly debated during the last few years, and extensive
debts have been considered to cripple growth prospects of particularly the poorest
LDCs. The HIPC Initiative is an attempt to provide comprehensive debt relief to the
poorest and most indebted countries. The World Bank and the IMF launched the first
version of it in 1996. In 1999 it was enhanced following global consultations in
Cologne, where it was considered necessary to provide more extensive and faster debt
relief with clearer links to poverty reduction.1
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the evaluation of the impact
of debt relief on the least developed countries. We will sketch what ingredients need to
be taken into account in the analysis and then use CGE-models to simulate some of
those impacts for the cases of Tanzania and Zambia. The models used are neoclassical
equilibrium models, which fail to take some potentially important disequilibria into
account. Some of the parameters that are used in the analysis are hypothetical, which
means that future analyses need to be refined to provide more reliable answers as to
how large the effects could be. We still believe that our analysis will throw some light
on the issues involved.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we outline the framework we use to
analyse the impact of debt relief. In Section 3 we provide brief reviews of the
economies of our two country cases, Tanzania and Zambia. Section 4 presents the two
CGE-models that are used in the analysis, while Section 5 presents the results of the
analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main results and suggests ways forward for
the analysis of debt relief impacts.
2 Evaluating the impact of debt relief
To analyse the economic impact of debt relief one needs to take account of at least two
issues. First we must ask how much resources are released under the HIPC Initiative.2
When the overall size of the HIPC assistance is identified one must determine how the
allocation of resources changes as a result of the new resources. A baseline is required
to assess the changes in government spending. For example, a baseline medium-terms
expenditure framework (MTEF) prepared before the receipt of HIPC assistance could
be compared with one that includes HIPC assistance. The evaluation of the impact of
HIPC assistance is complicated by the fact that is not possible to track only HIPC
1 IMF is the largest creditor followed by Japan and the World Bank. Multilaterals provide some 53 per
cent, bilaterals 46 per cent and commercial sources 1 per cent of the money.
2 Some HIPC assistance may not immediately show up in the fiscal accounts. For example, IMF HIPC
assistance would reduce the burden of debt service paid by the Central Bank. A special account is then
needed to identify HIPC assistance and when the assistance is provided transfers would be made to the
budget as grants (in the absence of a special account the transfer would show up as a profit transfer to
the budget with a lag). In a similar way HIPC assistance in the form of write-downs of public
enterprise debt guaranteed by the government will not be included in the budget unless arrangements
are in place to ensure that the assistance is passed on to the budget.2
funding. The link between aid and the recipient’s budgetary allocation is not
straightforward because much aid is fungible (Adam et al. 1994a and 1994b).3
When it comes to debt relief, there are in principle—as with budget support—two
options: either it can be used to increase government spending or to reduce taxes. Public
expenditures are clearly one of the main channels through which foreign aid influences
development outcomes. During periods of debt relief the government faces a difficult
intertemporal choice with regard to the setting the overall target for public expenditures.
Should it spend all the money immediately or ‘save’ some of the resources for the
future.
The most difficult question for the evaluation of the impact of debt relief concerns the
effect of government expenditures on growth, productivity and overall economic
welfare. All poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) aim to shift the composition of
public spending towards poverty-reducing programmes. Most strategies aim to enhance
the access of the poor to primary education and to primary and preventive health care
services, and to develop the infrastructure. While increased access to education and
health services would have a positive impact on the stock of human capital and
productivity of individuals, investment in infrastructure would primarily lower
transaction costs, which would have a positive impact on production activities and
investment and hence income. Thus while expansion of both social and economic
infrastructure should increase income in the longer term, the short-term benefits might
be larger through investments in economic infrastructure. Furthermore, it might be the
case that low incomes are a binding constraint determining household’s choice of using
public services such as education and health.
Another choice is whether the government really should spend all additional resources.
An alternative would be to reduce taxes, which could stimulate economic growth and
hence increase revenue and expenditures in the longer term. These tax measures could
take several forms, but essentially this use of the extra resources puts more money into
the private sector and shifts the spending decisions to private firms or individuals. The
benefit of reducing taxes in terms of additional private investment could be higher than
the benefit from increased spending on public services.4
Thus, the view of HIPC that is taken in this paper is that it releases extra government
resources, which can either be used to increase government expenditures or to reduce
taxation. Increased government expenditures can be in the form of increased public
consumption or increased public investment, while lower taxes may lead to higher
private investment or higher private consumption. It is these various choices and their
impacts that are focused in this paper.
3 While the empirical evidence about the extent of aid fungibility is mixed, the experiences of sub-
Saharan Africa show that aid may have unintended effects on expenditure patterns (Devarajan and
Hussain 1998).
4 Without going into details this opens up numerous possibilities. The tax system could be designed to
provide incentives for private sector development. Tax holidays and various investment tax incentives
are instruments now commonly used to attract foreign direct investments. However, promoting
investments through such policy measures may have some disadvantages. They may lead to greater
revenue loss than increases in investments.3
3 Tanzania and Zambia: two heavily indebted poor countries
3.1 Macroeconomic developments in Tanzania
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world with a large external debt.
Tanzania’s external is about US$ 7.3 billion, equivalent to 101 per cent of GDP in
December 1999. The debt burden has grown rapidly despite generous treatment of
Tanzania in Paris-Club negotiations. Since 1995 the Government of Tanzania has
improved the management of the economy and the past years have witnessed major
progress in stabilizing the economy. There has been progress toward a market-based
economy and movement away from the previous reliance on direct control mechanisms
and government ownership of the means of production. Recent achievements have
included fiscal consolidation, streamlining of the civil service, and the privatization of
about half of the parastatals.
There has also been a significant change in the efforts of the government to take control
of its development programme, particularly in the sphere of macroeconomic
management, where the government has led the preparation of the poverty reduction
strategy paper. Since the mid-1990s the macroeconomic performance has improved.
Compared to the early 1990s real GDP growth has increased and the average growth
rate for the 1995-2000 period was about 4.1 per cent (Table 1). Because of a population
growth rate of approximately 2.7 per cent this, however, implies only a modest
per capita income growth rate of 1.4 per cent during the period.
Agriculture is still the most important sector and performance has improved compared
to previous years. Other sectors such as mining, tourism, manufacturing, electricity and
water also showed improved performance. Tourism and mining, in particular, have
benefited a lot from various tax incentives such as tax holidays and investment
incentives. The tourism industry has become the largest foreign exchange earner and the
mining sector is booming.
Table 1
Growth rates of sector output and GDP, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Agriculture 1.2 3.1 2.1 5.8 3.9 2.4 1.9 4.1 3.4
Mining 7.7 8.2 15.0 11.7 9.6 17.1 27.4 9.1 13.9
Manufacturing -4.0 0.6 -0.2 1.6 4.8 5.0 8.0 3.6 4.8
Electricity and water -1.3 0.9 2.0 6.1 11.1 2.2 5.5 3.9 5.0
Construction 5.8 -14.4 1.4 -14.7 7.6 8.2 9.9 8.7 8.4
Trade -0.7 -0.4 1.1 3.5 3.5 5.0 4.7 6.0 6.5
Transport 14.2 0.1 0.9 5.9 1.1 4.9 6.2 5.8 6.1
Finance -0.9 -7.1 -5.2 6.0 10.4 -15.8 -3.0 0.7 3.3
Public administration and
other services 5.6 -3.9 -0.1 -2.7 1.6 3.2 2.7 3.5 3.6
GDP at factor cost 1.8 0.4 1.4 3.6 4.2 3.3 4.0 4.7 4.9
Source: IMF (2000).4
Table 2
Use of resources and external account (% of GDP at market prices)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private consumption 74.6 75.1 85.0 78.9 82.0 82.7 78.1 85.4
Private investment 15.9 16.3 17.8 17.5 16.0 13.1 11.0 12.4
Government expenditures 25.5 26.3 27.3 21.7 18.3 15.0 10.9 10.8
Government consumption 17.3 17.8 19.7 16.1 15.0 11.5 8.1 7.5
Government investment 8.2 8.4 7.7 5.7 3.3 3.5 2.7 3.3
Exports of goods and services 9.0 11.1 18.2 19.5 23.5 20.3 14.4 18.2
Imports of goods and services 25.0 28.8 48.3 37.7 39.8 31.1 14.5 26.9
Resource balance -16.0 -17.7 -30.1 -18.2 -16.4 -10.8 0.0 -8.7
Net factor income -3.4 -4.7 -3.5 -2.8 -2.1 -1.0 -1.5 -1.8
Net transfers 15.2 18.7 17.1 15.5 6.3 5.2 3.8 4.8
Current account deficit -4.2 -3.6 -16.5 -5.5 -12.1 -6.6 2.3 -5.7
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
The government has been quite successful in its attempt to stabilize the economy. One
of the major issues has been to cut down on government activities and there has been a
remarkable contraction. Since the peak in 1992 when government expenditure was
about 27 per cent of GDP, it has now been reduced to a mere 11 per cent (Table 2).
Public consumption in 1999 was only 7.5 per cent of GDP, and public investment has
been reduced quite dramatically, reaching 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1999. However, the
tight fiscal policy has not, so far, produced the intended boost in private investments.
Indeed, since the peak in 1993, private investment as a share of GDP has seen a steady
decline, reaching 12 per cent of GDP in 1998. This might suggest that an excessive
shake out of some public investment categories, such as investment in infrastructure,
could have the effect of lowering the productivity of private investment.5 As transport
costs and marketing margins are quite high in Tanzania, there is a case for the
government to support improvements in infrastructure in order to reduce transport costs
and marketing margins to support the rural areas (World Bank 2000).
Over the past few years Tanzania has made considerable progress in restoring fiscal
discipline. Excluding foreign aid there has been a surplus during the last two years at a
level of 0.9 and 0.7 per cent of GDP, respectively (Table 3). The drastic expenditure
cuts have had a negative impact in most sectors, however. To some extent, priority
sectors such as education, health, water, roads and agriculture have been protected
through additional resources made available through the Multilateral Debt Fund (MDF)
facility.6 Still, expenditures remain low, which is a reflection of the low domestic
revenue base in Tanzania. Despite a change in the tax structure, the revenue-GDP ratio
has been fairly constant in the 1990s, hovering around 11-13 per cent of GDP.
5 For example, poor infrastructure and deficient public services in Uganda significantly reduced
investments of private firms (Reinikka and Svensson 1999).
6 The funds are used for Tanzania’s debt service to multilateral institutions, including the World Bank,
IMF, African Development Bank and African Development Fund. By the end of December 1998
US$ 44.7 million, equivalent to TZS 23.6 billion, was disbursed into the MDF fund and TZS 18.2
billion was absorbed in the budget under the principle of protecting social sectors.5
In conjunction with the tight fiscal policy the authorities has followed a strict monetary
policy. Since 1993 the money supply-GDP ratio has been falling (Table 4). Looking at
the two components of money supply, we note that the economic reform programme has
had the anticipated effects; net foreign assets have increased and net domestic assets
have been reduced. Credit to the private sector, as a percentage of GDP, has been falling
quite significantly over the years. Instead of supporting long-term investment projects,
the financial sector still prefers lending to less risky activities such as Treasury Bills and
government securities (Table 4). This is partly a result of the lack of capacity to assess
creditworthiness within the commercial banks and problems associated with handling
commercial disputes. Another factor preventing a boost in private investment is the high
real interest rates still prevailing.
In April 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group’s
International Development Association (IDA) agreed to support a comprehensive debt
reduction package for Tanzania under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative. Total relief from all of Tanzania’s creditors is worth more than
US$ 2 billion, which is equivalent to more than half of the net present value of total debt
outstanding after the full use of traditional debt relief mechanisms.
Table 3
Internal balance (% of GDP at market prices)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total revenue including grants 15.8 18.0 20.3 16.7 15.0 16.7 15.9 16.4
Total revenue excluding grants 12.3 11.2 11.9 11.7 12.6 13.5 11.8 11.5
Private savings 21.4 21.0 8.3 17.0 7.3 4.8 8.3 1.2
Net flow of private savings
into the financial market 5.5 4.7 -9.5 -0.5 -8.8 -8.2 -2.7 -11.2
Government savings -9.7 -8.3 -7.0 -5.0 -3.4 1.6 5.1 5.5
Current account deficit -4.2 -3.6 -16.5 -5.5 -12.1 -6.6 2.3 -5.7
Notes: Government savings defined as government expenditures (Table 2) subtracted by total revenue
including grants (Table 3).
Table 4
Monetary survey, 1992-2000 (% of GDP at market prices)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Money supply (M3) 18.8 21.5 24.7 24.1 24.6 21.9 20.1 18.9
Net foreign assets 1.8 3.4 1.6 4.9 5.4 7.8 8.6 8.4
Net domestic assets 17 18.1 23.1 19.2 19.1 14.1 11.4 10.5
Credit to government 3.5 5.2 10.8 7.7 9.1 7.9 5.2 5.1
Credit to private sector 17.6 13.5 14.5 11.9 8.1 3.8 4 4.6
Other -4.1 -0.6 -2.1 -0.3 2 2.4 2.3 0.8
Lending to deposit ratio (%) 137.9 94.2 89.7 70.3 50.6 25.4 27.7 33.8
Treasury bills and securities to
total lending (%) 1.7 7.0 37.7 39.2 62.1 172.8 132.7 123.1
Source: Bank of Tanzania.6
The debt reduction operation will translate into debt-service relief over time of
US$ 3 billion, or about one-half of Tanzania’s debt-service obligations during fiscal
years 2001-03 and about one-third of Tanzania’s debt-service obligations thereafter.
The debt service-fiscal revenue ratio is expected to decline from 15 per cent to 9 per
cent during 2000-09. Thus, even though HIPC makes some additional resources
available the amount is not excessive.
But this will still create room for additional public expenditures on poverty reduction.
Tanzania will receive the bulk of the assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative,
when it satisfies a number of conditions including the adoption and implementation of a
participatory poverty reduction strategy paper.7 One of the key objectives of the poverty
reduction strategy is to promote accelerated and equitable growth. Specifically over the
three-year period 2000/01-2002/03 annual GDP growth is targeted to accelerate from
about 5.2 per cent to 6 per cent.8 Moreover if the targets are achieved, the government
anticipates that poverty (rural) will be reduced from 48 (57) per cent in 2000 to 42
(49.5) per cent in 2003 and 24 (29) per cent in 2010.
2.2 Macroeconomic developments in Zambia
The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) won the elections in 1991 on a
liberal platform. As soon as it was elected, it introduced its economic reform
programme (ERP) with the goal of arresting the economic decline. The donors
responded to the government’s efforts by resuming their support to the Zambia. During
the first two years there was rapid liberalization of the external trade and payments
system, and a move towards a market-determined exchange rate. Over a period of five
years, all licensing and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports were removed,
and the tariff structure was rationalized, and by 1994 Zambia had one of the most liberal
foreign exchange regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The reform programme has implied a tighter fiscal and monetary policy. The most
important part of the budget balancing process was expenditure reduction, which was
virtually unmatched in Africa. A cash budget was introduced in 1993. Capital
expenditures have been reduced, subsidies have been eliminated, military spending was
reduced, and the civil service experienced severe real wage reductions. Still, budgetary
discipline has remained a problem. In 1998 more than 10 per cent of expenditures were
spent on expenditures that were made in violation of the budget regulations. There were
substantial over-spending in general public services and massive cuts in economic
services and also some cuts in social services. At times, the fiscal weakness of the
country has not been fully appreciated when one looks at the central government budget
only. But one also needs to consider local governments, state-owned enterprises,
pension funds, special funds, and quasi-fiscal activities to get the full picture. There has
been a very substantial other quasi-fiscal deficit. The financial liberalization implied
that interest charges on domestic debt increased.
7 For a review on the current strategy to tackle poverty see United Republic of Tanzania (2000).
8 Although this is a relatively good performance compared to the past much higher growth rates would
be necessary to halve poverty by 2015.7
Table 5
Revenue in per cent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total revenue
(including grants)
24.6 32.9 33 26.3 30.2 29.0 26.8 24.8 24.9 25.5 26.7
Grants 4.3 14.2 14.7 10.5 10.1 9.2 6.1 5 6.5 7.9 8.4
Grants/total 17.5 43 44.5 40 33 31.7 22.3 20 26 31.8 31.5
Source: CSO (Quarterly Statistics from various years); IMF (2001).
Table 6
Monetary aggregates per cent, 1990-98
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Money supply
growth, M2
139 65 122 46 48 62 18 21 32 63
Bank rate 34 42 54 122.5 24.8 51.5 69.8 23.3 43.6
Inflation 107 97.7 165.7 183.8 54.6 34.9 43.1 24.4 24.5 27.1 25.9
Source: Bank of Zambia (2001).
Apart from the cash budget, the government has also attempted to balance the budget by
increasing revenue. In 1993, a revenue board was introduced, with a value-added tax
(VAT) put in place in July 1995, while user fees have been introduced for most social
services. The Zambia Revenue Authority has increased resource mobilization in the
form of taxes, while non-tax revenue collection still remains weak (Table 5).
During the first half of the 1990s, the government liberalized both maize and fertilizer
marketing, eliminating the associated subsidies. Most of the labour market controls
were also removed, but the most far-reaching liberalization efforts were in the financial
sector. The government freed interest rates in September 1992 and liberalized the
treasury bill market in January 1993. The immediate effect was a rise in interest rates
and positive real rates were achieved in mid-1993 (Table 6). In February 1994, the
government removed controls on the capital account for foreign payments. The
monetary stance has been to restrict the growth of money supply.
The most important strategic error in Zambia was the mishandling of the earlier engine
of growth, i. e., the copper mines, which were nationalized in the 1970s. Surpluses were
not reinvested in the mines, but were diverted to politically more important uses outside
the copper sector. There was inadequate supervision and management of the mines,
where political considerations often outweighed economic considerations. This neglect
meant that copper production fell from 825,000 tonnes in 1969 to 250,000 tonnes at the
end of the millennium. It was this decline in output that caused the income decline and
not so much the price changes. It was not until 1996 that the government acceded to the
privatization of the copper parastatal ZCCM, but the process was not concluded until in
March 2000. The drawn-out process for the privatization of the loss-making mines had
serious negative consequences for the economy.8
GDP growth has been uneven during the reform period (Table 7). There has been
drought, which has affected agriculture, while manufacturing output has been affected
by the removal of protection, the monetary squeeze, low internal demand and the
parastatal reforms. Per capita incomes fell by more than a quarter between 1990 and
2000. The mining industry declined throughout due to the production problems of the
ZCCM. Terms-of-trade developments have shown a declining trend, largely driven by
negative changes in copper prices (Table 8).
Finally, we can also note that there has not been any significant recovery of investment
in Zambia (Table 9). Since this was a major aim of the reform process, this is a major
setback. The government has not been able to establish a credible reform environment,
and the heavy burden of debt is certainly a part of the explanation to this.
Table 7
GDP and sector growth rates, 1990-2000 (change in %)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total GDP -3.4 -0.6 2.1 -0.2 -8.6 -2.3 6.6 3.3 -1.9 2.0 3.5
Non-agriculture -2.5 -1.4 7.4 -6.6 -12.3 -7.8 8.2 5.1 -2.0 2.2 5.5
Non-mining GDP -2.4 1.4 -0.1 1.8 -12.5 2.8 7.2 3.5 1.2 6.3 5.6
Real GDP per
capita index
100 96.4 95.6 92.6 81.6 73.6 76.5 77.5 73.6 72.8 72.9
Source: CSO (Quarterly Statistics from various years) and Zambia (2001b).
Table 8
Terms of trade and copper prices, 1990-2000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Terms of trade index
(1990=100)
100 105.9 94.5 82.4 89.1 99.5 76.8 93.4 83.8 79.1 89.6
LME price index 90 80 78 65 79 100 78 78 56 54 61
Source: IMF (1999) for the price index series; IMF IFS, and Bank of Zambia (2001).
Table 9
Gross domestic product by type of expenditure, 1990-2000 (in of GDP at current prices)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Consumption:
Public 14.8 16.2 17.9 13 13.1 15.5 18.3 17.5 15.8 13.4
Private 68.7 75.4 82.8 75.8 79.5 72.3 76.4 73.2 80.3 87.7
Investment including
change in stock
17.3 11 11.9 15 8.2 15.9 12.8 14.6 14.8 17.5
Trade balance -0.7 -2.6 -12.6 -3.8 -1.0 -3.8 -7.5 -5.2 -12.5 -18.6
Source: CSO (Quarterly Statistics from various years) and Zambia (2001b); new series from 1994.9
Table 10
Zambia: Debt service paid and external flows, 1990-99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Debt service paid,
US$ million
290 655 354 326 409 1584 319 217 147 136
Debt service paid in %
of exports of goods and
non-factor services
21.6 56.0 29.6 31.2 34.8 120.4 28.7 17.6 18.0 16.2
Debt service paid in %
of GDP
7.7 19.4 10.7 10.0 12.2 45.7 9.7 5.6 4.6 4.3
Debt service paid in % of
government revenue
38.2 103.7 58.3 63.2 60.9 230.2 47.1 27.9 24.4 24.5
Gross external inflows
(including rescheduling)
- - 1,106 795 550 1,816 510 401 297 511
Net external flows (official) - - 752 469 141 232 191 184 150 375
Source: IDA and IMF (2000b: 19).
It is clear that the debt burden is a serious threat to the economy (see Table 10), but
acceptance into the HIPC programme should go some distance towards solving this
problem. The executive boards of the IMF and the World Bank decided in December
2000 that Zambia qualifies for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. It was emphasized
that the budgetary resources released by debt relief were to be used for poverty
reduction and social sector development. Total debt service relief under the HIPC
amounts to US$ 2.5 billion in net present value terms or 62.6 per cent of the total debt
outstanding at the end of 1999 after the full use of the debt relief mechanisms. Zambia
has also requested the Paris Club to reschedule debt on Cologne terms. It is expected
that the Paris Club, at the completion point, will implement a stock-of-debt operation
leading to a sustainable external debt position for Zambia.
Zambia reached the decision point in December 2000, and the first interim relief started
flowing in January 2001. At the end of 1999 Zambia had a total foreign debt of
US$ 6.5 billion. After the predicted Paris Club forgiveness and various other debt relief
measures, it has a debt stock of about US$ 5.5 billion. It is estimated that 63 per cent or
US$ 3.8 billion of the 5.5 billion debt is to be written off.
As of January 2001, Zambia has started to receive interim relief from the World Bank,
IMF and eventually also from the African Development Bank and others. The end result
of these relief measure will be that during 2001-05 Zambia will lower its contracted
debt service costs by US$ 260 million per year and during the period 2006-15 by
roughly US$ 130 million per year. Compared to the actual debt service paid during
2000, however, Zambia will save only US$ 30 million per year over the next 15 years.
Between 2001 and 2003, when the completion point is expected to be reached, the Bank
will provide US$ 61 million of the total write-off of US$ 885 million that it plans to
provide on the total debt stock of US$ 1.7 billion.
For Zambia to reach the floating completion point, there are certain key objectives and
reforms that have to be achieved. With regard to poverty reduction it has to put a PRSP
in place through a participatory process, as well as a process of implementation and
monitoring for at least one year. In the social sectors it must make progress in the fight10
against AIDS, through the staffing of the AIDS Council, the integration of awareness
and prevention programmes in at least ten ministries, progress in education reforms by
increasing the share of education in the budget to at least 20.5 per cent, raising salaries
to the teachers in the rural areas above the poverty line, and to put plans in place to
increase retention of pupils in the poorer regions of the country. There has to be
progress on the health front as indicated by the launching of a plan to combat malaria,
the introduction of transparent procedures for the purchase of drugs, timely release of
health expenditure data, and the actual cash releases to district health management
boards shall be at least 80 per cent of the amounts budgeted.
4 Model frameworks
In Section 2 we discussed some of the ways in which debt relief may affect an
economy. In this section we concretize this by setting up two computable general
equilibrium models to analyse the impacts in Tanzania and Zambia, which are then used
to simulate the impact of debt relief. Both the Tanzanian and the Zambian models are of
a fairly standard neoclassical type, although they have somewhat different
characteristics.
4.1 The Tanzania model9
There are three sectors in the model: agriculture, manufacturing and services. The trade
and production structure in the model is specified as a multi-level nest of different
functional forms. At the highest level of aggregation the Armington (1969) specification
is used, which defines a composite commodity for each sector as a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function of commodities produced domestically and imported from
abroad. Output in each sector is either sold on the domestic market or exported. A
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) framework allocates domestic output
between exports and domestic sales. Sectoral gross output is a CES function of
aggregate labour and composite capital, while demand for intermediate goods is given
by a Leontief technology. Composite capital in the agricultural sector is defined as a
CES function of capital, land and aggregate labour. Aggregate labour is a set of nested
CES functions for five different labour categories; highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled,
unskilled and casual labour. CES functions allow for imperfect substitution at each
level. In a nested production structure, producers will choose the optimal mix of
primary factors at each stage in the production process. At any level, primary factors are
demanded up to the point where factor prices, inclusive of sector-specific differentials,
equal marginal value product of the specific factor.
The model is run with the assumptions of a mobile labour force and fixed sector-
specific capital augmented by investment each period. In the labour market it is
assumed that each sector initially has a specific combination of labour categories. Total
supply of each category is assumed constant and demand varies with changes in each
category’s wage rate. Factor incomes of capital and land are distributed to two
institutions: enterprises and proprietors of land. Enterprises keep a fixed proportion of
9 This model follows the approach popularized by Dervis, de Milo and Robinson (1982) and the Social
Accounting Matrix used in this study is a modified version of the Tanzanian 1992 SAM developed by
Wobst (1998).11
capital income, net of taxes, as retained earnings while the remaining share is
distributed to households. In the agricultural sector, factor income from land plus a
government transfer, is directly transferred to households. Sectoral factor incomes of the
various labour categories, as well as other sources of income such as remittances from
abroad and government transfers, are distributed in fixed proportions to the various
households. Households pay a direct tax to the government, while a fixed proportion of
household disposable income is saved. Finally, consumer demand of the various
households in the model is given by a Stone-Geary linear expenditure system (LES).
Besides direct taxes, government derives revenue from import tariffs on goods, transfers
from abroad (aid) and indirect taxes levied on domestic output. Government savings
equal revenue less current expenditures on goods and services, transfers and interest
payments on foreign loans. Adding savings from households, enterprises, and foreign
savings equals total savings in the economy. Government investment is exogenous in
the model, while aggregate private investment is assumed to be endogenous. At the
sectoral level, private investment is determined by fixed coefficients. Goods demanded
for investment purposes from the private sector are derived with the help of a capital-
coefficient matrix. Fixed expenditure shares determine also government demand of
investment goods.
The model incorporates complementary productivity effects of both private ad public
investments in sectoral production functions. Total factor productivity growth in each
sector is a function private investment in the sector and to public investment, both of
them normalized by the sectoral capital stock.10 Thus, depending on the amount
invested, both private and public, total factor productivity changes in the following
period.
The final block in the model defines equilibrium in the markets for factors, commodities
and foreign exchange. Given behavioural and institutional constraints (elaborated upon
above), there is a set of prices in the model solution that represents market equilibrium.
Domestic prices for imports and exports are products of world prices (exogenously
given) multiplied by the ‘nominal’ exchange rate, adjusted for tariffs. The price of the
composite good is the sum of total values of domestic sales out of total output and
values of imports divided by total output of the composite good. In a similar way
sectoral output price is defined as the value of domestic sales and exports divided by
total output. Price of value added or the net producer price is equal to the output price,
adjusted for indirect taxes, less the cost of intermediate inputs per unit of output. The
price of a unit of capital is defined as a weighted average of the prices of capital goods
by sector of origin. A weighed producer price index is defined as the numeraire in the
model. Given the numeraire and assuming exogenous capital inflows, movements in the
exchange rate equilibrate the external account. An increase in the exchange rate would
increase tradable prices relative to nontradable prices leading to a real depreciation. This
will increase exports and reduce imports.
10 See Fargeix (1990) for more details.12
4.2 The Zambia model
This model is a Walrasian type of general equilibrium model with a dynamic
specification.11 The main purpose of the modelling strategy was to build a model that is
suitable for the analyses of investment changes due to various policy changes. The
model incorporates different ways of modelling endogenous investment and capital
formation in a dynamic setting with several linked time periods. Since the capital stock
and thus productive capacity depends on investment, we have chosen a neoclassical
type of production function approach in order to have a direct two-way link between
investment and other economic variables.
The economy is divided into seven sectors or commodities. The supply of each
commodity is determined by domestic production and imports. Essentially, production
is determined by the amount of capital available in each sector and the amount of skilled
and unskilled labour that is occupied in the production process of each sector. With a
relatively high price of a commodity, domestic production is larger than at a lower
price. Furthermore, with a high domestic price of a good, imports also tend to be high.
This is to say that supply increases with the price of the commodity.
Demand is determined by demand for intermediate goods in the production process, by
private and public demand, investment demand and export. Demand decreases as prices
increase. Prices in the model are determined in such a way that demand equals supply of
each commodity. Furthermore, wages are found for which labour supply equals labour
demand.
Investment depends on savings and the marginal efficiency of capital in each sector. An
increase in the capital stock, i.e. investment, is undertaken as long as it yields profitable
production. This induces changing capital stocks over time and determines the growth
of production and GDP. Due to financial constraints of the economy, the model uses a
balance of trade condition meaning that net borrowing from abroad is limited. Financial
aid can thus be modelled as a lowering of the balance of trade constraint, yielding less
export and an increase in imports. This has a tendency to increase domestic demand and
to increase domestic prices and profits, which in turn will increase investment and
growth. A decrease in savings, which may be the consequence of increased
consumption, may have a tendency to lower investment.
Foreign aid can also be modelled as an increase in capital stocks interpreted as ‘gifts’ of
productive capital. With an increase in the capital stock, there is also an increase in
growth. Supply will increase and lower prices and profits, which will have a dampening
effect on further investment. Reducing debt service makes it possible to increase public
demand and public investment. In the model simulations it is assumed that an increase
of the capital stock in the production of public services is composed of imported capital
goods in excess of imports subject to the balance of trade constraint. Reduced debt
service is thus partly replaced by an increase of imports.
11 The model used is presented in full in Andersson, Bigsten and Persson (2000).13
5 Simulation result
To say something about the magnitude of the impact of debt relief, we use the two
CGE-models presented in the previous section for simulations. The models are not
exactly the same, which means that we have to be cautious about comparing the results
across countries. We are more confident in comparing different scenarios within one
country. However, by having two models with somewhat different designs applied on
similar cases, we can get some indication about the extent to which the results depend
on the model specification.
5.1 Results of simulations with the Zambian model
The simulations with this model are presented for two periods only, but this is sufficient
to show how rates of growth and investment levels change. We have a base solution that
assumes that nothing has happened with regard to debt service. We follow the approach
outlined in Section 2, and assume that HIPC reduces interest and amortization payments
of the government. In our simulation we assume that HIPC annually releases resources
for the government corresponding to 1 per cent of GDP. This is based on an estimate of
how much actual payments change relative to the preceding years. Relative to
contractual obligations the debt reduction represents a reduction in debt service of about
10 per cent of GDP.
Next we assume that the resources are used to increase public spending and/or reduce
taxes in the Zambian economy.12 We introduce the changes in a step-wise fashion, to
see how much of the effect of the full package derives from each ingredient:
1) In the first step we simply increase public consumption demand by 0.5 per cent of
GDP, that is we use half the resources released to increase public consumption.
2) In the second step we add a secondary effect of increased public expenditures. We
assume that the HIPC-related increase in expenditures is particularly focused on
education, and we simulate the impact of this by increasing the number of labourer
in the skilled labour category by 0.5 per cent per year and we reduce the number in
unskilled labour to the same degree.13 This productivity-enhancing effect of public
expenditure would in the real economy take an extended period of time before it is
realized, but we assume that it has an impact already in period one and two. We thus
try to capture the more long-term effects within the framework of our limited model.
3) In this step we assume that 0.5 per cent of GDP in period 1 is used to increase public
sector investment (but changes 1 and 2 are not included here).
12 Increased public investment is modelled by increasing productivity in the production of public
services by 0.5 per cent in year 1. Increased public consumption is assumed to increase the supply of
skilled labour. Skilled labour increases by 0.5 per cent above the population growth rate while
unskilled labour reduces its share.
13 Jung and Thorbecke (2001) endogenize the production of new human capital in a more sophisticated
way, but also they assume that it has an impact already in the first after the base period period in their
two-period model.14
4) In this step we assume that public sector investment also has an effect on public
sector productivity. We thus add to step 3 an increase in public sector productivity
by 0.5 per cent in period one and this effect is maintained in period two.14
5) Then we combine experiments 2 and 4, that is increase in both public consumption
and public investment with their assumed indirect effects.
6) We add an attempt to simulate the effect of a tax reduction. Since we do not have
taxes explicitly in the model, we simulate a tax reduction by assuming higher
savings in the economy.
7) Finally, we add the tax reduction effect to simulation 5 to get the effect of a
complete package. The sums of our changes in public consumption and public
investment are equal to 1 per cent of GDP, while the simulated tax cut comes on top
of that. We do not have any easy way of measuring the size of the tax cut required to
this increase in savings and investment, so this final step is even more hypothetical
than the previous ones.
It should be noted that our numbers for the magnitude of some of these effects are
hypothetical, and much research is needed to provide a solid underpinning of the
estimates. The uncertainty of those effects also means that the effects of debt reduction
that we estimate are also uncertain. The growth results from our simulations are shown
in Table 11. The full results of experiment 5 are provided in Appendix 1.
The results show that the impact of a debt reduction of the type implemented in Zambia
is going to have rather limited growth effects. We simulate the impact of a combined
increase in public consumption and investment corresponding to 1 per cent of GDP. If
we also assume certain indirect productivity effect, we do get an increase in the growth
rate of around 0.2 per cent (experiment 5). This is not insignificant, but by itself it is not
going to change the situation in Zambia in any dramatic way. In the simulation, the
capital stock is expanding and with a capital-output ratio of say 1-2 the increase in GDP
seems a bit low. One reason is that changes in the composition of demand affect
investments in the various sectors and this will have an impact on GDP. Investments in
sectors with ‘low’ productivity will dampen GDP growth. When we add in our attempt
to simulate a tax cut, we do get a slightly larger effect in year 2 but this experiment is a
bit hard to evaluate. We also refer to another experiment in footnote 12 where we
assume that public sector infrastructure investments increase productivity throughout
the economy. Then we do get a more dramatic increase in output, but since we do not
have any empirical basis for our assumption in the experiment, we will not draw to far-
reaching conclusions from that.
The restrictions of an analysis of this sort are rather obvious. Due to the nature of the
model, there are some effects that cannot be taken into account. For example, if capacity
utilization is restricted because of a shortage of imported inputs, debt reductions may
14 As an alternative experiment we assumed that increased investments in the public sector infrastructure
are increase the profitability of investments throughout the economy. The productivity in all sectors is
therefore increased by 0.5 per year over and above what is implied in the base solution. If the impact
of infrastructure investments were as large as that we would get a very substantial impact on the
economy. The growth rate in period one increases by 0.52 per cent and in period 2 by 1.00 per cent.
This is by far the largest effect we have got in any of our simulations, but since we are very uncertain
about the realism of this simulation we relegate it to this footnote.15
make it possible to increase capacity utilization. This is not dealt with in this model.
There are also factors such as political will and ability that we do not take into account
at all (see Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa [2000] and Bigsten [2001]).
Table 11
Growth impacts of HIPC-financed policy interventions in Zambia
(percentage changes relative to the baseline)
Experiment
Growth in year 1 relative to
the base solution (%)
Growth in year 2 relative to
the base solution (%)
1) Increase of public consumption by 0.5
%o fG D P
0.07 0.07
2) 1 plus accumulation of human capital 0.11 0.14
3) Increase in public investment by 0.5 %
of GDP
0.04 0.04
4) 3 plus increased productivity in the
public sector
0.07 0.07
5) 2 plus 4 0.19 0.21
6) Tax reduction 0.00 0.00
7) 5 plus 6 0.19 0.25
5.2 Results of simulations with the Tanzania model
As described above, the Tanzania model is slightly different from the Zambia model.
The model runs over four periods, capturing the amount of resources expected to be
released during 2000-05.15 In the baseline scenario we have assumed that the economy
grows on average by 4.5 per cent over the period. In the various experiments we look at
the impact of a foreign interest payment reduction combined with four different policy
scenarios. In the first scenario we assume, as in the Zambian case, that half of the
resources released are used for public consumption. In the second experiment we add a
‘human capital’ effect of increased public current expenditures. The number of
labourers in the skilled labour categories increases by 2.9 per cent per year while the
growth rate of those regarded as unskilled is reduced to keep the overall growth rate at
2.5 per cent.16 In the third scenario we assume, as in the Zambian case, that half of the
resources released by HIPC are used to increase public sector investment. In the fourth
experiment we assume that public sector investments also have an effect on private
sector productivity. In the final experiment we add the second and the fourth
experiment, assuming both human capital and productivity effects of increased public
spending.
15 The debt service/government revenue ratio is assumed to decline from 15 to 10 per cent. The amount
of resources ‘saved’ from debt relief amounts to 4.4 per cent of GDP, which is distributed in pieces
over the years (0.7, 1.0, 1.2 and 1.5 per cent of GDP, respectively).
16 In the baseline scenario all labour categories are assumed to grow by 2.5 per annum. The ‘education
effects’ of increasing the growth rate to 2.9 per cent among skilled categories are based on estimates
from Jung and Thorbecke (2001).16
Table 12 and 13 show the result of the various scenarios. Compared to the Zambian
results, we note the impact is rather similar with one notable exception, the impact of
productivity effects. The impact of increased public spending is rather modest
regardless of whether it is public consumption or investment that is increased
(simulation 1 and 3). In these two experiments the impact of public spending is limited
to either increased demand for investment goods (if capital expenditures are increased)
or a higher wage bill (if current government expenditures are increased). Thus, just
looking at HIPC resources as additional resources to stimulate demand would not
generate any substantial gains.
What would be the impact if public resources were used to accumulate human capital in
the economy? As in the Zambian case, this is modelled in a rudimentary manner
assuming that the number of skilled labourers increases relative to the unskilled. The
GDP growth rate would increase by 0.1 percentage units in the first period and 0.15
percentage units in the last period, which is quite close to the Zambian results.
However, the impact is still modest. What would be the impact of increased public
investment combined with improved productivity? The impact in the first period is
modest, as productivity gains materialize in the following periods, but thereafter growth
rates are increasing and at the end of the period the GDP growth rate is 2.4 percentage
units higher than the baseline.17
In the final experiment we combine, as in the Zambian case, simulation 2 and
simulation 4 to get the combined effects of increased public spending, accumulation of
human capital and changes in productivity. Compared to the baseline, GDP growth rates
are increasing in all periods and particularly towards the end of the periods simulated.
Thus, if resources were targeted to human capital accumulation and succeed in inducing
productivity changes, the impact on real GDP could be quite substantial. In period 4,
GDP growth rate would be approximately 2 percentage units higher compared to the
baseline growth rate. However, as in the Zambian case our model specification is not
based on any detailed assessment of the ‘true’ impact of human capital accumulation
and changes in productivity. This is illustrated by comparing experiment 4 and 5.
Adding human accumulation to public investment plus productivity effects actually
lowers the growth rates, as increased public consumption crowds out private
investments. Although there is a positive impact of accumulation of human capital and
public investments, there is a net loss as private sector investments decline. Whether
productivity changes as a result of lower private investments outweighing the positive
impact of higher public spending is an important issue to consider. Thus, as highlighted
earlier, it is important to undertake a more detailed analysis of the impact on public
spending. Particularly important are complementarities between public investments and
developments in the private sector. Moreover, the analysis would certainly benefit if
public spending could be disaggregated into health, education and infrastructure
spending, for example. Another potentially important aspect that is missing from the
model is the monetary sector. Debt relief would certainly impact on financial markets,
which would be an important channel to investment and future growth.
17 Note that productivity changes as a result of an increase in both public and private investment.17
Table 12
Growth impacts of HIPC-financed policy interventions in Tanzania (real GDP growth rates)
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Baseline scenario 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.4
1) Increase in public consumption 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4
2) Increase in public consumption +
accumulation of human capital 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.5
3) Increase in public investment 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4
4) Increase in public investment + productivity
effects 4.7 4.6 5.7 6.8
5) 2 + 4 4.8 4.5 5.6 6.7
Table 13
Growth impacts of HIPC-financed policy interventions in Tanzania
(Percentage units difference from the baseline scenario)
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
1) Increase in public consumption 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
2) Increase in public consumption +
accumulation of human capital 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.16
3) Increase in public investment 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
4) Increase in public investment + productivity
effects 0.01 0.10 1.30 2.42
5) 2 + 4 0.10 0.05 1.21 2.28
6 Conclusions
This paper discusses some issues on how to evaluate the impact of HIPC debt relief in
the case of Tanzania and Zambia using two computable general equilibrium models.
Both countries are among the poorest and most indebted countries in the world. Last
year both Zambia and Tanzania qualified for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. There
is a strong emphasis that the budgetary resources released by debt relief should be used
for poverty reduction and social sector development. In both countries the debt burden
is a serious threat to the economy, but the acceptance into the HIPC programme should
go some distance towards solving this problem.
Within our relatively simple model framework, the macroeconomic impact of debt relief
seems modest. In the case of Zambia, where we combine debt relief with increased
public spending and lower taxes, the GDP growth rate increases by about 0.2 per cent.
In the case of Tanzania, a combination of debt relief, increased public spending and
accumulation of human capital would increase real GDP by 0.2 percentage units. One
reason for this relatively modest effect is that the annual injection of additional
resources relative to current actual debt service is small in both cases, which implies
that the impact of debt relief per se would be expected to be modest. However, as
illustrated in the case of Tanzania, the impact could be considerably higher if additional
public investment succeeds in improving private sector productivity.18
Still, our approach fails to incorporate certain factors that relate increased public
spending to growth, productivity and overall economic welfare. For example, increased
access to education and health services would have a positive impact on the stock of
human capital and productivity of individuals, and investments in infrastructure would
lower transaction costs, which would have a positive impact on production activities
and investment and hence income. We also fail to allow for the fact that the countries
will now be meeting their contractual debt service obligations, which should make them
















Production -0.40 0.10 -0.38 0.14 1.37 0.05 2.35
Consumption -0.30 -0.40 -0.44 0.00 -0.64 0.00
Public demand 2.80
Investment demand 0.00 0.26 0.00
Export 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import 0.00 0.00 -1.89 0.23 0.00
Sector GDP -0.48 -0.24 -0.62 0.00 3.13 -0.10 1.61
Investment by sector 0.00 0.00 -1.85 0.00 2.50 0.00 -2.17
Market price -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 0.21 -0.10 -0.21
Producer price -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.21
Capital stock 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.53 0.10 2.43
MP of capital -0.78 -0.23 0.00 0.00 2.47 -0.47 0.00
Real GDP 0.19 Consumption value -0.54
Trade balance 0.00 Government income 0.00
Skilled wage -0.10 Unskilled wages -0.20
Skilled employment 0.59 Unskilled employment -0.14
Wage incomes 0.08 Disposable profits 0.00 Disposable income 0.00
Savings 0.30 Investment 0.21
Period 2
Production -0.25 0.10 -0.35 0.26 1.34 0.10 2.54
Consumption -0.56 -0.38 -0.42 0.00 -0.30 0.00
Public demand 2.80
Investment demand 0.00 0.51 1.49
Export 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00
Sector GDP -0.23 -0.26 -0.59 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.69
Investment by sector -3.03 0.00 0.00 1.14 0.00 0.60 0.00
Market price -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.42
Producer price -0.10 -0.24 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.20 -0.42
Capital stock 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.50 0.06 2.32
MP of capital -0.78 -0.27 -4.35 0.00 1.45 0.00 -3.03
Real GDP 0.21 Consumption value -0.46
Trade balance 0.00 Government income 0.00
Skilled wage -0.41 Unskilled wages 0.20
Skilled employment 0.95 Unskilled employment -0.42
Wage incomes 0.00 Disposable profits 0.00
Savings 0.44 Investment 0.21 D ISP INC 0.0020
Appendix 2: Application of the Zambian model
The model has been applied to Zambian data together with some assumed parameter
values. The applied model has the following seven sectors: agriculture, mining, food,
manufacturing, construction, private services and public services.
In our numerical examples we have used a fairly moderate growth rate of the labour
force. We have assumed that both skilled and unskilled labour grow by 2.5 per cent per
year. We have assumed that average annual depreciation of the capital stock is 5 per
cent. In our base case, this implies that capital grows by about 1 per cent per year.
Furthermore, productivity grows by 2.5 per cent per year.
In this case, real GDP grows by an annual 4.2 per cent. With a balance of trade
constraint, domestic production prices decline in comparison with world market prices
by 2 per cent per year. Growth in GDP means growth in import demand, which must be
paid for by exports, which, can only be accomplished by improved terms of trade. There
is an increase in total real private consumption of about 4.2 per cent per year.
Investment increases by 4.4 per cent.
Nominal wages decline by about 1 per cent per year and there is also a slight decline in
(nominal) marginal productivity of capital. The corresponding decrease in real wages is
due to the larger growth rate of the labour force in comparison with the growth rate of
capital. Net savings out of GDP is 14 per cent.21
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